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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING-MAN-
DATORY SENTENCING STATUTE REQUIRING LIFE IMPRIS-
ONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE FOR HABITUAL OFFENDERS 
OF VIOLENT CRIMES SATISFIES THE EIGHTH AMEND-
MENT'S PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE WHEN APPLIED TO 
A FOURTH CONVICTION OF DAYTIME HOUSEBREAKING. 
State v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 530 A.2d 1223 (1987). 
A man was convicted of daytime housebreaking in the Circuit Court 
of Baltimore County. 1 The trial court found that at least three of the 
man's eight prior convictions2 qualified as recidivist convictions and sen-
tenced the defendant to life imprisonment without parole pursuant to 
article 27, section 643B of the Maryland Annotated Code (the "recidivist 
statute"). 3 The defendant contended that the severity of the sentence 
1. The defendant was convicted pursuant to article 27, section 30(b) of the Maryland 
Annotated Code, which provides: "Any person ... who shall be convicted of the 
crime of breaking a dwelling house in the daytime ... with intent to steal ... the 
personal goods of another of any value therefrom, shall be guilty of a felony .... " 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 30(b) (1982). A jury found Davis guilty of this offense in 
January, 1985 based upon evidence of his fingerprints found on the victim's window, 
his presence in the vicinity of the victim's home on the day of the crime, and his 
possession of the victim's stolen property. See Davis v. State, 68 Md. App. 581, 585, 
514 A.2d 1229, 1231 (1986), rev'd, 310 Md. 611, 530 A.2d 1223 (1987). 
2. The state cited eight prior convictions of Davis for daytime housebreaking or bur-
glary dating back to 1966. Following a detailed pre-sentencing investigation, the 
trial court decided that four of the convictions served as predicates for application 
of the enhanced sentence. This decision was subsequently affirmed by the court of 
special appeals and the court of appeals. See Davis, 68 Md. App. at 586-87, 514 
A.2d at 1231-32; State v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 615-23, 530 A.2d 1223, 1225-29 
(1987). 
3. Section 643B of article 27 of the Maryland Annotated Code provides: 
§ 643B. Mandatory sentences for crimes of violence. 
(a) "Crime of violence."-As used in this section, the term "crime 
of violence" means abduction; arson; burglary; daytime housebreaking 
under § 3O(b) of this article; kidnapping; manslaughter, except involuntary 
manslaughter; mayhem and maiming under §§ 384, 385, and 386 of this 
article; murder; rape; robbery; robbery with a deadly weapon; sexual of-
fense in the first degree; sexual offense in the second degree; use of a hand-
gun in the commission of a felony or other crime of violence; an attempt to 
commit any of the aforesaid offenses; assault with intent to murder; assault 
with intent to rape; assault with intent to rob; assault with intent to com-
mit a sexual offense in the first degree; and assault with intent to commit a 
sexual offense in the second degree. 
The term "correctional institution" includes Patuxent Institution and 
a local or regional jailor detention center. 
(b) Mandatory life sentence.-Any person who has served three 
separate terms of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of 
three separate convictions of any crime of violence shall be sentenced, on 
being convicted a fourth time of a crime of violence, to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole. Regardless of any other law to the con-
trary, the provisions of this section are mandatory. 
(c) Third conviction of crime of violence.-Any person who (1) has 
been convicted on two separate occasions of a crime of violence where the 
convictions do not arise from a single incident, and (2) has served at least 
one term of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of a con-
viction of a crime of violence, shall be sentenced, on being convicted a 
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was disproportionate to the gravity of his offense because none of the 
offenses precipitating these convictions had involved an element of vio-
lence or a threat of violence.4 Consequently, the court of special appeals 
held that the gravity of the defendant's offenses did not justify such a 
severe sentence, and found the recidivist statute unconstitutionally dis-
proportionate as applied.5 The court of appeals, however, reversed the 
lower court and held that the sentence of life imprisonment without pa-
role for a fourth conviction of daytime housebreaking did not offend the 
proportionality doctrine of the eighth amendment. 6 
Proportionality, a philosophy which maintains that the severity of 
punishment be in proportion with the gravity of the offense, is presently a 
fundamental element of the American criminal justice system at both the 
federal and state level. 7 This philosophy is derived from the English Bill 
of Rights8 and is embodied in the eighth amendment to the United States 
third time of a crime of violence, to imprisonment for the term allowed by 
law, but, in any event, not less than 25 years. Neither the sentence nor any 
part of it may be suspended, and the person shall not be eligible for parole 
except in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 B, § 11. A separate 
occasion shall be considered one in which the second or succeeding offense 
is committed after there has been a charging document filed for the pre-
ceding occasion. 
(d) Compliance with Maryland Rules.-If the State intends to pro-
ceed against a person as a subsequent offender under this section, it shall 
comply with the procedures set forth in the Maryland Rules for the indict-
ment and trial of a subsequent offender. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B (Supp. 1988). This statute defines daytime house-
breaking as a violent crime. [d. § 643B(a). Consequently, a fourth separate convic-
tion of daytime housebreaking may be punished by a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole. [d. § 643B(b). 
4. Brief for Appellee at 5-6, State v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 530 A.2d 1223 (1987) (No. 
87-142); see Davis, 68 Md. App. at 591, 514 A.2d at 1233. Davis was convicted of 
stealing items worth only $100. Of the four predicate convictions, the two most 
recent were for stealing items of even lesser value. This includes a conviction for the 
theft of ten chocolate-chip cookies and a pound of salami lunch meat. [d. at 591-92, 
514 A.2d at 1234. No evidence was presented to show that Davis used a weapon or 
encountered anyone during the commission of his prior crimes. /d. at 591,514 A.2d 
at 1234. 
5. Davis, 68 Md. App. at 595, 514 A.2d at 1236. The court of special appeals, how-
ever, rejected Davis' equal protection attack on the recidivist statute. Davis claimed 
that the recidivist statute had not been enforced uniformly and therefore did not 
provide him with equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth 
amendment. [d. at 589, 514 A.2d at 1233. The court rejected this argument be-
cause Davis failed to show either that the enforcement of the recidivist statute was 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose, or that the invocation of the statute was 
based on an arbitrary classification. [d.; see also Middleton v. State, 67 Md. App. 
159, 168-72, 506 A.2d 1191, 1194-97, cert. denied, 308 Md. 146, 517 A.2d 771 
(1986). 
6. Davis, 310 Md. at 631-32, 530 A.2d at 1233. 
7. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOIT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 162-64 
(1972). 
8. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 codified the long-standing English policy against 
disproportionate penalties and prohibited penalties that were unauthorized by stat-
ute and beyond a court's jurisdiction. 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689); see L. BERK-
SON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 3 (1975); see also 
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Constitution.9 
The proper scope and application of the proportionality doctrine, 
however, has been the subject of much debate. to Traditionally, legal 
Granucci, "Nor Cruel or Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840, 860 (1969); Note, Solem v. Helm: The Courts' Contin-
ued Struggle to Define Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 590, 
592-93 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Struggle to Define]; Note, What is Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54, 55 (1911) [hereinafter Note, What is Cruel 
and Unusual]. The English enacted this legislation to address illegal or excessive 
penalties rather than penalties that allowed brutal methods of punishment or execu-
tion. L. BERKSON, supra, at 3-4; see Granucci, supra, at 848, 859. Some historians 
claim that the English Bill of Rights of 1689 was a reaction to the treason trials 
(appropriately named "The Bloody Assize") occurring in England during that pe-
riod. Sentences for treason involved the drawing of a convicted man on a cart to the 
gallows where he was hung by the neck, then cut down while still alive, only to be 
disembowelled and have his bowels burned before him-after which he was be-
headed and quartered. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENT ARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 92 (cited in Granucci, supra, at 854). 
Such practices, however, continued long after the enactment of the English Bill 
of Rights of 1689. This, combined with the fact that the "Bloody Assize" was not 
referred to in the House of Commons debate on the Bill of Rights as either "cruel" 
or "illegal," leads to the conclusion that no prohibition on the methods of punish-
ment was intended. Rather, the term "cruel and unusual" can be interpreted as 
referring only to punishment unauthorized by statute and beyond the jurisdiction of 
the court. See L. BERKSON, supra, at 3-4; Granucci, supra, at 855-56. Thus, meth-
ods of punishment considered abhorrent by today's standards were generally un-
challenged unless they were disproportionate to other criminal penalties or not 
sanctioned by law. 
9. The eighth amendment provides: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights con-
tains the following similar language: 
That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines Unposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted, by the Courts of Law. 
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 25; see Walker v. State, 53 Md. App. 171,452 
A.2d 1234 (1982) (stating that article 25 is derived from the same source as the 
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, and is therefore pari materia 
with the eighth amendment); see also MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 16 ("[N]o 
Law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any case, or 
at any time, hereafter."). 
In 1776, delegate George Mason adopted the language of the English Bill of 
Rights verbatim in his drafting of a provision in the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
which served as the foundation for the eighth amendment in 1791. See C. COLLIER 
& J. COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787 332-35 (1986); Granucci, supra note 8, at 840. Thus, the drafters of the 
eighth amendment implicitly adopted the English principle of proportionality. See 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983) (the Bill of Rights was drafted to ensure 
that American citizens were entitled to the same rights as the citizens of England). 
But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 377 (1972) (Burger, c.J., dissenting) 
("From every indication, the Framers of the Eighth Amendment [sic] intended to 
give the phrase a meaning far different from that of its English precursor."). 
10. See Note, Solem v. Helm: Proportionality Review 0/ Recidivist Sentencing Is Re-
quired By The Eighth Amendment, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 149, 150 n.6 (1983) [herein-
after Note, Proportionality Review]; Note, What is Cruel and Unusual, supra note 8, 
at 55. See generally Baker & Baldwin, Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Length 
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practitioners thought the doctrine applied only to the prevention of tor-
turous punishment or execution. II This ideology can be attributed, in 
part, to an American misinterpretation of the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the English Bill of Rights. 12 The modem view, however, 
recognizes the constitutional right to freedom from all forms of excessive 
punishments. 13 Supreme Court decisions addressing the proportionality 
issue throughout the past century illustrate this evolution. 14 
O'Neil v. Vermont IS was the first Supreme Court decision to contain 
an opinion that recognized the proportionality doctrine within the eighth 
amendment. 16 In O'Neil, the defendant was faced with a potential sen-
tence of more than 54 years in prison for violations of Vermont's liquor 
sales lawsP Although the Court did not address whether the sentence 
violated the eighth amendment,IS the dissent argued that "punishments 
which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to 
the offences [sic] charged" violate the eighth amendment. 19 The dissent 
reached this conclusion by reasoning that the legislative history of the 
eighth amendment demonstrated an intent to prohibit all punishments 
deemed excessive.20 
The Court formally adopted the proportionality doctrine almost two 
decades later in Weems v. United States. 21 In Weems, the defendant was 
sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment, including hard labor in chains 
and permanent civil forfeitures, as a result of his conviction for falsifying 
a public document.22 Finding that the defendant's sentence was exces-
sively cruel and unusual, the Court stated that "it is a precept of justice 
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the 
offense. "23 
of a Criminal Sentence: Following the Supreme Coun "From Precedent to Prece-
dent," 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 25 (1985) (a comprehensive examination of the develop-
ment of Supreme Court cases addressing the proportionality issue). 
11. See L. BERKSON, supra note 8, at 10; Baker & Baldwin, supra note 10, at 27; Note, 
Struggle to Define, supra note 8, at 593. 
12. See L. BERKSON, supra note 8, at 65; Granucci, supra note 8, at 860-65; see also 
supra notes 8-9. 
13. See, e.g., Helm, 463 U.S. at 284 ("The ... [cruel and unusual] clause prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime 
committed."); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 586 (1977) ("the Eighth Amendment 
bars not only those punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are 'exces-
sive' in relation to the crime committed"); see also Baker & Baldwin, supra note 10, 
at 27-28. 
14. See generally Baker & Baldwin, supra note 10. 
15. 144 U.S. 323 (1892). 
16. See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 10, at 28. 
17. O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 327-30. 
18. The majority dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and because the eighth 
amendment did not yet apply to the states. ld. at 331-32. 
19. [d. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting). 
20. [d. at 360-64 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 370-71 (Harlan & Brewer, JJ., dissenting). 
21. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
22. [d. at 364-65. 
23. [d. at 367. 
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In addition to recognizing the proportionality doctrine as a constitu-
tional standard, Weems is significant in two other respects. First, by re-
lying on the fact that the defendant had been punished more severely 
than persons who had committed more serious crimes in the same juris-
diction as well as persons in other jurisdictions who had committed the 
same crimes,24 Weems was the first Supreme Court decision to render a 
broad interpretation of the eighth amendment based upon objective sen-
tencing comparisons.25 Second, because the Weems Court found the leg-
islatively created punishment to be unconstitutional, the decision has 
been interpreted as an early indication that legislative power to determine 
crimes and punishments, although substantial, is not absolute.26 
The Weems decision went virtually unchallenged for 70 years until 
the critical plurality opinion in Rummel v. Estelle. 27 In assessing 
whether a sentence of life imprisonment under a Texas recidivist statute 
was unconstitutionally disproportionate,28 the Rummel Court employed 
a strict policy of legislative deference in an effort to comply with the 
principles of federalism. 29 Citing societal interests as the reason for deal-
ing more harshly with repeat offenders, the Court yielded to the state 
legislature for the determination of felony sentences.30 The Court further 
suggested that judicial review of state recidivist statutes was generally 
appropriate only in regard to capital punishment because of the finality 
and absoluteness of death. 31 
Rummel's "bright-line" approach to reviewing the proportionality 
doctrine of the eighth amendment, however, failed to require an exami-
nation of the factual details of each case, such as the absence of violence. 
Consequently, the Court implicitly rejected the comparative analysis test 
24. Id. at 381-82. 
25. See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 10, at 29; Note, Struggle to Define, supra note 8, at 
594-95; see also Note, Interpretation Of The Eighth Amendment-Rummel, Solem, 
and the Venerable Case of Weems v. United States, 1984 DUKE L.J. 798-803 (1984) 
[hereinafter Note, The Eighth Amendment]. This objective sentencing comparison 
became the basis of the porportionality test adopted by the Court in Solem v. Helm, 
463 U.S. 277 (1983). See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. 
26. See supra note 25. Such an interpretation is supported by the separation of powers 
doctrine. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
27. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
28. Prior to a conviction in 1973 for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, Rummel had 
been convicted for fraudulent use of a credit card and passing a forged check. Id. at 
265-66. Because Rummel's 1973 conviction constituted his third felony conviction, 
he was sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to Texas' recidivist statutes. See 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974). 
29. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274-75. 
30. Id. at 275-76. The Court indicated that all states have an interest "in dealing in a 
harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are 
simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal 
law." Id. at 276. 
31. Id. at 271-72. The Court also distinguished Weems on the basis of the peculiar 
punishments imposed in that case. Id. at 272-74; see also text accompanying note 
22. 
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suggested in Weems.32 The plurality reasoned that reference to factual 
details lacked true objectivity and that complex comparisons of various 
states' recidivist arrangements were unpersuasive in light of such vari-
ables as parole policies and prosecutorial discretion. 33 In dissent, how-
ever, Justice Powell espoused an objective three-part test for 
proportionality review in response to the plurality opinion. 34 
Although the Supreme Court reaffirmed Rummel one year later,35 
Justice Powell's test for proportionality ultimately prevailed in Solem v. 
Helm. 36 In Helm, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole under South Dakota's recidivist statute 
because of his six prior felony convictions. 37 To assist in determining 
whether the defendant's sentence was unconstitutionally disproportion-
ate to his crime, the Court outlined the following test: (1) A comparison 
of the gravity of the offense with the harshness of the penalty; (2) a com-
parison of sentences imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction; 
and (3) a comparison of sentences imposed for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.38 
The Court, however, indicated two qualifications on the scope and 
applicability of this proportionality test. First, the Court noted that none 
of these factors alone are controlling. Rather, each factor must be con-
sidered within the totality of circumstances. 39 Second, the Court pref-
aced its discussion of the test by emphasizing that appropriate deference 
to both legislative authority and trial court discretion were considera-
tions in judicial review of proportionality issues.4O In conclusion, how-
ever, the Court found that it was necessary to establish an objective 
means for determining when such legislative deference was inappropriate 
32. Baker & Baldwin, supra note 10, at 36; see also Dressler, Substantive Criminal Law 
Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Estelle: Proportionality and Justice as En-
dangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J. 1063, 1089-95 (1981) (a comprehensive analysis and 
critique of the Rummel decision). 
33. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 279-82. 
34. Id. at 295 (powell, J., dissenting). This test was later adopted by the Court in Solem 
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. 
35. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam). In Hutto, the defendant 
received a sentence of twenty years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for the posses-
sion and distribution of marijuana. The amount of marijuana found on the defend-
ant was approximately nine ounces with a street value of about $200. The Court 
refused to consider the details of the defendant's case claiming such an examination 
would permit too much SUbjectivity. Without extensive reasoning or explanation, 
the Court defended its position in Rummel and concluded that the lower court's 
decision lacked any objective basis. Id. at 374-75. 
36. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
37. Prior to his 1979 conviction for uttering a "no account" check for $100, Helm had 
been convicted three times for third-degree burglary, three times for driving while 
intoxicated, once for obtaining money under false pretenses and once for grand lar-
ceny. Id. at 279-83. 
38. Id. at 294. 
39. See id. at 295; see also Baker & Baldwin, supra note 10, at 68-69. 
40. Helm, 463 U.S. at 290. 
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because no penalty was per se constitutional.41 
Because the Court in Helm did not expressly overrule Rummel,42 
the adoption of Justice Powell's test appears to conflict with the analysis 
in Rummel.43 This incongruity has led some recent commentators to 
conclude that, from a historical perspective of the proportionality doc-
trine, Rummel should be viewed as an aberration.44 Consequently, 
courts in federal and state jurisdictions have generally applied the Helm 
reasoning to decide proportionality issues.45 The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, however, has declined to accept the rationale of Helm as control-
ling on all proportionality issues.46 Instead, the court appears to have 
adopted a more conservative approach, similar to the Rummel decision, 
when deciding proportionality issues.47 
In State v. Davis,48 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that it was 
constitutionally permissible for the Maryland Legislature to mandate a 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a fourth conviction of 
daytime housebreaking, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant's 
crimes lacked any element of actual violence.49 To arrive at this conclu-
sion, the court found it necessary to determine the appropriate level of 
review to be given to the defendant's proportionality challenge. 50 Ac-
41. [d. 
42. The majority in Helm did not overrule Rummel because they found the facts in 
Rummel to be distinguishable. Whereas Rummel was eligible for a reasonably early 
parole under the Texas recidivist statute, Helm was sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole. See id. at 304 n.32. A forceful dissent, however, 
argued that the Rummel Court had categorically rejected the very same proportion-
ality analysis that was adopted by the Helm majority. [d. at 306 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). Further, the dissent opined that Rummel was an affirmative rule of law 
that applied to all sentences of imprisonment, other than the death penalty or bi-
zarre physically cruel punishments. [d. at 307 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also 
supra text accompanying note 22. 
43. Baker & Baldwin, supra note 10, at 46-47; Note, Struggle to Define, supra note 8, at 
608; Note, The Eighth Amendment, supra note 25, at 792-94, 798. 
44. See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 10, at 49; see also Dressler, supra note 32, at 1088-
1117. 
45. See, e.g., Seritt v. Alabama, 731 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1984); Rhoden v. Israel, 574 F. 
Supp. 61, 65 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Commonwealth v. Middleton, 320 Pa. Super. 633, 
467 A.2d 841 (1983). But see United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1028 (4th 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986) (Helm "requires an extensive propor-
tionality analysis only in those cases involving life sentences without parole"); 
Mosely v. State, 500 So.2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (sentence of life imprison-
ment without parole upheld without a Helm proportionality review). 
46. State v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 629, 530 A.2d 1223,1232 (1987). Several years prior 
to the Helm decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
identified and applied an objective proportionality test in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 
136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). The Fourth Circuit, there-
fore, can be credited with structuring the analytical framework relied upon by the 
Supreme Court in Helm. As such, it is unusual that the Maryland Court of Appeals 
would not adopt principles fostered within its own federal circuit. 
47. See Davis, 310 Md. at 629-31, 530 A.2d at 1232-33. 
48. 310 Md. 611, 530 A.2d 1223 (1987). 
49. [d. at 629-32, 530 A.2d at 1232-33. 
50. [d. at 623-28, 530 A.2d at 1229-32. 
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cording "substantial deference" to the General Assembly's classification 
of daytime housebreaking as a crime of violence and emphasizing the 
stringent requirements of Maryland's recidivist statute, the court deter-
mined that a Helm proportionality review was not required.51 Instead 
the court employed a less extensive proportionality analysis of the de-
fendant's sentence. Under this review, the court considered sentences 
found to be constitutional in other jurisdictions52 as well as the severity 
of the criminal conduct and the requirements of the recidivist statute. 53 
Nevertheless, the court did apply the three-prong proportionality test of 
Helm to further substantiate its holding that the application of a 
mandatory life sentence pursuant to Maryland's recidivist statute was 
not unconstitutionally disproportionate. 54 
In applying the first criterion of Helm, comparing the seriousness of 
the crime with the harshness of the penalty, the court acquiesced to the 
General Assembly's classification of daytime housebreaking as a violent 
crime. 55 Citing its earlier analysis, 56 the court added that "the risk of 
personal harm and the right to be free from intrusion" were concerns 
sufficient to justify the inclusion of daytime housebreaking within this 
classification. 57 Therefore, the court concluded that the seriousness of 
the crime is compatible with a sentence of life imprisonment without pa-
role under the recidivist statute. 58 
In considering the second criterion, comparing the severity of the 
sentence under consideration with the sentences for more serious crimes 
in Maryland, the court adhered to a policy of legislative deference. 59 The 
court noted that a narrow construction of the recidivist statute permits 
the sentence of life imprisonment without parole only upon the fourth 
separate conviction of daytime housebreaking, or any other offense in-
51. [d. at 628-29, 530 A.2d at 1232. The court of appeals appears to have assigned 
greater weight to the statement in Helm regarding legislative deference than to the 
pronouncement in Helm of the objective three-part test. [d. 
52. See, e.g., Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 
(1975) (sentence of life imprisonment upheld without a Helm proportionality review 
where prior offenses all involved the potentiality of violence); Mosely V. State, 500 
So.2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (sentence of life imprisonment without parole 
upheld without a Helm proportionality review where prior offenses consisted of 
rape, theft, burglary and breaking into an automobile); State v. Vance, 262 S.E.2d 
423 (W.V. 1980) (court declined to apply a Helm proportionality review where third 
felony offense carried the potentiality of violence). 
53. Davis, 310 Md. at 628-32, 530 A.2d at 1232-33. 
54. [d. at 632-39, 530 A.2d at 1233-37. 
55. [d. at 633-35, 530 A.2d at 1234-35. 
56. The court employed the same analysis for the first criteria of the Helm review as it 
did for determining that a Helm review was not required. See id. at 633, 530 A.2d 
at 1234; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
57. Davis, 310 Md. at 635, 530 A.2d at 1235. The court also noted that the maximum 
sentence imposed for housebreaking was greater in many other jurisdictions than it 
was in Maryland. [d. at 633-35, 530 A.2d at 1234-35. 
58. [d. at 631, 530 A.2d at 1233. 
59. [d. at 635-36, 530 A.2d at 1235-36. 
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cluded within the statutory classification of violent crimes.60 The court 
defended the legislature's exclusion of certain inherently violent crimes 
from section 643B(a), such as burglary with explosives,61 child abuse, 62 
third degree sex offenses,63 and poisoning water,64 as rational within the 
proportionality context because, hypothetically, each offense could be 
charged as one of the section 643B violent crimes.6S 
For the third criterion of Helm, the court examined the sentencing 
treatment of habitual housebreakers in other states as compared to 
Maryland.66 The court found that the defendant could have been sen-
tenced to life imprisonment for three or less housebreaking convictions 
under several state statutes.67 Therefore, the court reasoned that the 
constitutional proportionality of the Maryland recidivist statute, which 
provides life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a fourth 
conviction of housebreaking, was preserved.68 
The Davis court's holding that a Helm extended proportionality 
analysis was not required in this case is improper for several reasons. 
First, the court of appeals placed emphasis on a paragraph in the Helm 
opinion promoting legislative deference,69 but elected to ignore the next 
60. Id. at 635, 530 A.2d at 1235. 
61. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 34 (1987). 
62. Id. § 35A. 
63. Id. § 464B (prohibiting the intentional touching of a nonconsensual victim's anal or 
genital area by: employing or displaying a dangerous or deadly weapon; inflicting 
suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, or serious physical injury; threatening or 
otherwise placing the victim in fear; being aided and abetted by one or more individ-
uals; or by committing the offense against an incapacitated victim). 
64. Id. § 451. 
65. The court interpreted article 27, section 451 broadly in its explanation of why the 
offense of poisoning water is not classified by the General Assembly as a "violent 
crime." The court stated that "[it] is probably a crime against property, e.g., farm 
animals. If the conduct were directed at a human being, it would seemingly be 
attempted murder, a § 643B crime of violence." State v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 636, 
530 A.2d 1223, 1236 (1987) (emphasis supplied). In regard to child abuse, the court 
of appeals concluded that as a practical matter, four separate convictions would be 
precluded by the mere nature of the offense. Id. at 636, 530 A.2d at 1235-36. Fi-
nally, the court rationalized that under the correct circumstances, some of the ex-
cluded dangerous crimes, such as burglary with explosives, could be treated simply 
as burglary for purposes of the recidivist statute - this, the court implied, is merely 
a prosecutorial perogative. Id. at 635-36, 530 A.2d at 1235. 
66. Id. at 636-39, 530 A.2d at 1236-37. 
67. Id. at 638, 530 A.2d at 1236-37; see D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1801(b), 22-104(a) 
(1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-1401, 18-1402, 19-2514 (1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 
140.20 (McKinney 1975),70.10 (McKinney Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
11-312 (Law Co-op Supp. 1987), 17-25-45 (Law Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1987); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-202, 76-8-1001 (1978); W. VA. CoDE §§ 61-3-11, 61-11-18 
(1984). The court also noted that the defendant could have been sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole after his fourth conviction for housebreaking in at 
least two other states. Davis, 310 Md. at 638, 530 A.2d at 1237; see NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 205.060, 207.010.2 (Michie 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
§§ 22-7-8, 22-6-1(3) (Michie 1988). 
68. Davis, 310 Md. at 638, 530 A.2d at 1237. 
69. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1980); see supra text accompanying note 40. 
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sentence of the paragraph which states that "no penalty is per se consti-
tutional."70 When viewed in its entirety, this statement in Helm implies 
that the eighth amendment requires courts to scrutinize criminal statutes 
to ensure that the punishment corresponds with the circumstances of the 
crime, rather than merely acquiescing to the language of the legislature. 
Therefore, by giving undue deference to the legislature,71 the Davis deci-
sion fails to embrace the fundamental principles of proportionality evi-
denced in the legislative history of the eighth amendment'2 and Supreme 
Court cases such as Solem v. Helm. 73 
A second criticism of the Davis holding concerns the court's role in 
acting as a part of the judiciary branch of government. The separation of 
powers doctrine requires that the judiciary bear the responsibility of de-
termining the constitutionality of legislation. 74 Simply yielding to legisla-
tive discretion is tantamount to a breach of this judicial duty.7s 
Accordingly, judicial review has been recognized as necessary to resolve 
issues concerning the proportionality of sentencing legislation.76 As one 
member of the Supreme Court stated: "[J]udicial enforcement of the 
[cruel and unusual punishments] clause ... cannot be evaded by invoking 
the obvious truth that legislatures have the power to prescribe punish-
ments for crimes. "77 Therefore, the court of appeals, by affording undue 
deference to the legislative classification of crimes that justify life impris-
onment without parole, failed to adequately consider the separation of 
powers issue in its treatment of Davis. 
A third criticism of the holding is the court's adherence to principles 
that are not controlling under the circumstances. The court relied upon 
principles of legislative deference enunciated by a Supreme Court that 
was motivated by an interest in protecting federalism. 78 Supreme Court 
70. Helm, 463 U.S. at 290; see supra text accompanying note 41. 
7l. See Davis, 310 Md. at 629, 530 A.2d at 1232. 
72. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. 
73. 463 U.S. 277 (1983); see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
74. See MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 8; see also Attorney General v. Waldron, 
289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. 
Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656, rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 656 (1962); 
Barnes v. Meleski, 211 Md. 182, 126 A.2d 599 (1956); H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 8-10 (2d ed. 1979). 
75. See Bames v. Meleski, 211 Md. 182, 126 A.2d 599 (1956); see also supra note 74. 
76. See State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497,500 (S.D. 1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) ("It 
is incumbent upon this court to determine the propriety of such a sentence at this 
juncture; another branch of government should not be burdened with rectifying this 
injustice. "); Baker & Baldwin, supra note 10, at 30 (interpreting the Court's decision 
in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the authors state that the Court's 
holding "was an unequivocal assertion of the power and, indeed, an acknowledg-
ment of the constitutional duty to perform the [sentencing] review function."). 
77. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
78. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 303 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); U.S. 
CONST. amend. X; see also Mackey, Rationality Versus Proportionality: Reconsider-
ing the Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sanctions, 51 TENN. L. REV. 623, 630-31 
(1984) (a critical review of the Supreme Court's treatment of federalism in regard to 
proportionality review). 
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cases have frequently cited legislative deference as a means to preserve 
the states' sovereign right to enforce criminal laws and set penalties.79 In 
Davis, however, the discretion of the Maryland General Assembly was 
not reviewed by the federal judiciary, but by a state court, and therefore, 
federalism was not an issue because Maryland's sovereignty was not 
threatened. 
Finally, the court failed to distinguish the defendant's challenge of 
the recidivist statute as applied to him individually from a "facial" chal-
lenge attacking the statute's general purpose and construction.80 The 
court merely addressed the legitimate legislative purpose of the statute 
(the protection of the public) and the construction of the statute (the 
statute's requirement of four convictions).81 These issues, however, were 
not raised by the appellant. Had the court of appeals addressed the de-
fendant's challenge of the statute as applied to him individually, an ex-
amination of the factual details of Davis' convictions would have been 
necessary. 82 
Despite holding that extended proportionality review was not re-
quired, the Davis court went on to address the application of the Helm 
objective test to the facts of the case from a hypothetical perspective. 83 
79. See, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. 263; Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982). 
80. The defendant challenged the statute as it applied to him individually. See supra 
note 4 and accompanying text. The facial validity of the recidivist statute has been 
repeatedly sustained by precedents which justify the purpose and operation of sec-
tion 643B(b). See Montone v. State, 308 Md. 599,521 A.2d 720 (1987); Middleton 
v. State, 67 Md. App. 159,506 A.2d 1191, cert. denied, 308 Md. 146,517 A.2d 771 
(1986); Bryan v. State, 63 Md. App. 210,492 A.2d 644, cm. denied, 304 Md. 296, 
498 A.2d 1183 (1985). Like most habitual offender statutes, it serves a legitimate 
and rational state interest in protecting the safety and security of its citizens, and in 
providing enhanced punishment for repeat offenders displaying an inability to re-
form. In Montone, the court stated: 
Thus, the picture that emerges is one of a [recidivist] statute specifically 
designed to identify and target a unique class of people so that they may be 
permanently exiled from our free society. These are the violent criminals 
who have been exposed to the correctional system three distinct times, 
who have refused to conform their conduct to societal standards, and who, 
instead, have demonstrated violent criminal behavior after each encounter 
with the correctional system, thus evidencing the futility of any hope for 
their rehabilitation. 
Montone, 308 Md. at 606, 521 A.2d at 723. In this regard, the statute accommo-
dates the principal objectives common to all criminal laws. See W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTT, JR., supra note 7, § 5 (discussing the purposes of criminal punishment in-
cluding rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence and restraint). 
81. State v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 629, 530 A.2d 1223, 1232 (1987). 
82. The examination of factual details places an unquestionable strain on the court sys-
tem and jeopardizes judicial economy. See Note, Proportionality Review, supra note 
10, at 172-75. This could be considered a compelling state'interest justifying a con-
stitutional rejection of the Helm test under certain circumstances. However, the 
court failed to articulate this position in its decision. Further, a counter-argument 
can be maintained that judicial efficiency and economy are not sufficiently compel-
ling interests to avoid a factual review where a defendant is subject to the possibility 
of life imprisonment without parole. 
83. Davis, 310 Md. at 632-39, 530 A.2d at 1233-37. 
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The court apparently applied the criteria in an effort to further substanti-
ate its holding that the sentence was constitutional. 84 The court's mo-
tive, however, may have tainted its objectivity; its application of each 
criterion can be characterized as an effort to perpetuate a conservative 
application of the proportionality doctrine-a result-oriented approach. 
Furthermore, in applying the Helm test, the court also failed to consider 
the totality of the circumstances as required by the test and treated single 
factors as controlling.8s 
The fallaciousness of the Davis court's application of the Helm test 
is demonstrated by the court's treatment of the first and second criteria. 
The court concluded that the first criterion of the Helm test86 was satis-
fied because the serious nature of repeated daytime housebreaking justi-
fied the harsh penalty of life imprisonment without parole.87 Again, the 
court's rationale was a resort to a policy of legislative deference, yielding 
to the discretion of the Maryland General Assembly and other state leg-
islatures for the classification of daytime housebreaking as a violent 
crime.88 This rationale can be challenged, however, because it indicates a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the teachings of Helm;89 it ignores the 
court's role under the separation of powers doctrine;90 and it fails to 
maintain a distinction between an "as applied" challenge and a "facial" 
challenge.91 
In regard to the application of the second Helm criterion, which 
compares the severity of the sentence under consideration with the 
sentences for more severe crimes in the same jurisdiction, the court's ra-
tionalizations that other inherently violent crimes were appropriately ex-
cluded from the recidivist statute are unpersuasive.92 The offenses that 
are excluded from the recidivist statute all contain an element of assault 
84. The court of appeals determined that the sentence was constitutionally proportional 
without the application of the Helm test. [d. at 629, 530 A.2d at 1232; see also 
supra notes 48·54 and accompanying text. 
85. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
86. Davis, 310 Md. at 633·35, 530 A.2d at 1234-35; see also supra notes 38-41 and ac· 
companying text. 
87. Davis, 310 Md. at 628·30, 633·35, 530 A.2d at 1232, 1234·35. 
88. [d. at 633·35, 530 A.2d at 1234-35; see also supra notes 51, 56 and accompanying 
text. 
89. Although the Helm Court stated that a state has a justified interest in punishing a 
recidivist more severely than a first·time offender, it also noted that the offender's 
status could not be examined in the abstract. Helm, 463 U.S. at 296. Consequently, 
the Helm Court considered the factual circumstances of the defendant's prior 
crimes in applying the first criteria of the test. See id. at 296·97. 
90. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
91. The court noted that daytime housebreaking carried a potential for violence, yet it 
ignored the fact that none of Davis' prior crimes contained any element of violence. 
Compare Davis v. State, 68 Md. App. 581,591,514 A.2d 1229, 1234 (1986) (consid· 
ering the absence of violence in applying the first criterion of Helm) with Davis, 310 
Md. at 628·29, 633·35, 530 A.2d at 1232, 1234-35 (noting the hypothetical potential 
for violence in daytime housebreaking). See also supra notes 4, 48·58, 80-82 and 
accompanying text. 
92. See Davis, 310 Md. at 635·36, 530 A.2d at 1235·36. 
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and battery or, as in daytime housebreaking, present a potential for vio-
lence.93 Multiple convictions for these crimes, however, are not subject 
to the enhanced sentencing provisions of the recidivist statute. There-
fore, Davis' enhanced sentence for daytime housebreaking is dispropor-
tionate to the punishments imposed for these equal, if not more serious, 
offenses. Additionally, the court's argument that each excluded offense 
could be charged as one of the section 643B(a) violent crimes is inconsis-
tent.94 For example, the crime of daytime housebreaking, aggravated by 
an element of violence,9s could be charged as robbery in many circum-
stances provided larcenous intent can be shown. 96 
Conversely, the Davis court's analysis of the third criterion was not 
inconsistent with the analysis performed in Helm.97 The court applied 
the principles of federalism appropriately in concluding that a state's 
right to sovereignty allows it to penalize criminal violations without be-
ing influenced by other states.98 Furthermore, although Helm requires a 
comparison of the sentencing possibilities in other states with the treat-
ment in question,99 the Supreme Court failed to provide guidelines to 
determine what percentage of states must have comparable punishment 
in order to satisfy this requirement. To satisfy the third criteria, there-
fore, the court's reliance on a small minority of jurisdictions with similar 
sentencing guidelines cannot be faulted. 
The Davis decision may stifle future constitutional challenges to sen-
tencing in Maryland. The burden of persuasion is already on a defendant 
to demonstrate the disproportionality of a challenged criminal sen-
tence,100 and the holding in Davis makes this burden even heavier. Fur-
thermore, the result in Davis places undue influence on a recidivist 
defendant to negotiate a plea bargain because the application of article 
27, section 643B remains largely within the discretion of the State's At-
torney.101 Finally, the Davis court's application of the Helm test, despite 
93. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
94. See Davis, 310 Md. at 635, 530 A.2d at 1235. 
95. As used in this context, an "element of violence" may include the carrying of a 
handgun or the display of any other form of weapon or degree of force. See W. 
LAFAVE & A. Scon, JR., supra note 7, at 696-700. 
96. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 486 (1982). Robbery is a common law crime in 
Maryland, defined as "the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal prop-
erty of another ... by violence, or by putting him in fear." Darby v. State, 3 Md. 
App. 407, 239 A.2d 584 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1970). 
97. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291-92, 299-300 (1983) with Davis, 310 Md. 
at 636-39, 530 A.2d at 1236-37. 
98. Davis, 310 Md. at 636-38, 530 A.2d at 1236-37; see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 
U.S. 447, 464 (1984) ("The Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State 
reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to admin-
ister its criminal laws. "). 
99. See supra notes 38, 66-68 and accompanying text. 
100. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, JR., supra note 7, at 51. 
101. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(d) (Supp. 1988); see also Sinclair v. State, 278 
Md. 243, 363 A.2d 468 (1976); Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 
(1975); Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86,40 A.2d 319 (1944). 
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finding such an analysis unnecessary, 102 leaves the Maryland practitioner 
uncertain as to the standard to be applied in future proportionality chal-
lenges. 103 Not only must the practitioner consider the more conservative 
approach of Rummel when assessing the probability of a successful pro-
portionality challenge, he must also remain cognizant of the Helm 
criteria. 
In State v. Davis, the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted a con-
servative application of the eighth amendment proportionality doctrine 
that jeopardizes the fundamental principles of proportionality. The 
court afforded too much weight to legislative deference and failed to rec-
ognize the distinction of a challenge regarding the application of the stat-
ute as opposed to the intent or structure of the statute. This reasoning 
has led to an anomaly within Maryland law. Although daytime house-
breaking has been classified as a "violent crime"-legitimately punish-
able by life imprisonment without parole for a fourth conviction--other 
crimes, inherently more threatening, have been excluded from this classi-
fication. By failing to clearly indicate the standard that will be applied to 
future proportionality challenges, the Davis decision has ratified the legis-
lature's inconsistent classifications, and has placed an undue burden 
upon criminal defense attorneys challenging the proportionality of a 
sentence. 
Thomas Patrick Ott 
102. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. 
103. Although the Davis court can be criticized for failing to enunciate a decisive stan-
dard for proportionality challenges, much of the confusion stems from the Helm 
Court's failure to clearly indicate when a court should engage in an extended pro-
portionalityanalysis. See Note, Proportionality Review, supra note 10, at 166-172. 
Because of this omission, an extended proportionality analysis will often be within 
the discretion of the court. Compare Mosely v. State, 500 So.2d 108 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1986) (sentence of life imprisonment upheld without a Helm proportionality 
review) with Commonwealth v. Middleton, 320 Pa. Super. 633, 467 A.2d 841 (1983) 
(sentence of life imprisonment upheld only after a Helm proportionality review); see 
also supra note 45. 
